Compulsory DNA Collection and a Juvenile\u27s Best Interests by Lapp, Kevin
University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender
and Class
Volume 14 | Issue 1 Article 3
Compulsory DNA Collection and a Juvenile's Best
Interests
Kevin Lapp
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/rrgc
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more
information, please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kevin Lapp, Compulsory DNA Collection and a Juvenile's Best Interests, 14 U. Md. L.J. Race Relig. Gender & Class 53 (2014).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/rrgc/vol14/iss1/3
Lapp   7/21/2014 2:45 PM 
 
 
COMPULSORY DNA COLLECTION AND A JUVENILE’S BEST 
INTERESTS 
 
Kevin Lapp* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The federal government and every state but Hawai’i mandates 
DNA collection from juveniles
1
 as a result of some contact with the 
criminal justice system.
2
 A criminal conviction, an adjudication of 
juvenile delinquency, or an arrest can all trigger mandatory DNA 
collection. Seized DNA samples are analyzed to produce a DNA 
profile that is entered into a searchable database through which law 
enforcement matches individuals and crime scene DNA evidence.
3
 A 
main justification for compulsory DNA collection from juveniles has 
been the claim that it deters recidivism and promotes rehabilitation.
4
 
The enacting legislation in several states, for example, includes a 
finding that DNA databasing is “an important tool in deterring 
recidivist acts.”5 Courts have likewise identified “the fact that 
                                            
*Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I want to thank Lee 
Kovarsky, and the Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class for 
organizing an excellent symposium and allowing me to participate. 
1
 Throughout this article, I use “child”, “children, “juvenile”, and “youth” 
interchangeably to mean individuals under the age of 18, fully aware that in some 
states juvenile court jurisdiction cuts off at 16 or 17, and that psychosocial research 
and developmental science indicate that a person’s brain is not fully developed until 
the mid–twenties. ELIZABETH SCOTT AND STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 44 (2008); Brief for the American Medical Association, et al. as Amici 
Curiae, at 13-16, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (noting that frontal cortex not fully 
developed until early adulthood). 
2
 JULIE E. SAMUELS, ET. AL., COLLECTING DNA FROM JUVENILES, iii (2011) (“every 
state except Hawaii collects DNA from some category of juveniles . . .”). 
3
 See Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 291, 294–97 (2010). 
4
 Natalie Ram, Fortuity and Forensic Familial Identification, 63 STAN. L. REV. 751, 
790 (2011) (“In upholding statutes compelling database inclusion for convicted 
offenders against Fourth Amendment claims, courts have relied on two rationales: 
prisoners' diminished expectations of privacy, and states' interests in having accurate 
tools of identification and preventing recidivism.”). 
5
 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29–4102 (2010) (“The Legislature finds that DNA 
data banks are an important tool . . . in deterring and detecting recidivist acts”); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:602 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-1.5-2 (1998); N.J. 
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collection and storage of DNA . . . has a deterrent and rehabilitative 
effect” in upholding the constitutionality of compelled DNA collection 
from juveniles.
6
 DNA collection has also been said to “aid,” 
“advance” and “further” the deterrent and rehabilitative goals of the 
juvenile court,
7
 and found consistent with the juvenile court’s role as a 
“protecting parent.”8 In short, legislatures and courts believe 
compulsory DNA collection from juveniles to be in the best interests 
of children.  
 
There is little empirical evidence, however, that compulsory 
DNA collection deters people from committing crimes or fosters their 
rehabilitation. While some researchers have found a small reduction in 
recidivism attributable to deterrence for some offense categories, 
others insist that no empirical evidence supports the claim that DNA 
databases deter crime.
9
 Whatever specific deterrence DNA databasing 
may achieve is certainly diminished with respect to juveniles, who are 
less deterrable than adults.
10
 The paucity of evidence for a deterrent 
                                                                                                       
STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.28 (1994); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 12-12-1102 (1997); 44 PA. 
STAT. ANN. § 2302 (2005). 
6
 In re Lakisha M., 882 N.E.2d 570, 579 (Ill. 2008) (emphasis added). 
7
 In re Calvin S., 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559, 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (the rehabilitative 
goal of the juvenile court is “aided by DNA testing of juvenile felons”); Lakisha, 
supra note 6, at 579 (DNA collection from juveniles “advances, rather than conflicts 
with, the [deterrence and rehabilitative] goals of our Juvenile Court Act.”); In the 
Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action Nos. JV–512600 & JV–512797, 
930 P.2d 496, 501–02 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (DNA collection “further[s] the 
protective and rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court”). 
8
 Maricopa Cnty., supra note 7, at 501–02. 
9
 Cf., SHELDON KRIMSKY AND TONIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE: DNA DATA 
BANKS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 148 (2011) (“currently 
there is no empirical evidence to support the often–stated claim that DNA databases 
deter crime”); compare with, AVINASH BHATI, QUANTIFYING THE SPECIFIC 
DETERRENT EFFECTS OF DNA DATABASES, 57 (2010) (finding 2–3% reductions in 
recidivism risk attributable to deterrence for robbery and burglary as a result of DNA 
databasing, but increases in recidivism risk attributable to deterrence for other crime 
categories). 
10
 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (“the same characteristics that 
render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less 
susceptible to deterrence”); Christopher Slobogin and Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile 
Justice: The Fourth Option, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1, 44 (2009) (“compared to older 
individuals, adolescents are less risk–averse, more prone to give into peer pressure, 
less likely to have a stake in life, more present–oriented, less likely to have 
perspective, and more likely to rush to judgment. All of these traits tend to produce 
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effect in general, together with juveniles’ lesser deterrability, 
undermine the best–interest rationale for collecting DNA from 
juveniles. Indeed, to the extent that criminal justice contact has a 
criminogenic effect on juveniles,
11
 making it easier to catch young 
offenders more quickly and more often (which DNA databasing most 
certainly does),
12
 DNA collection from juveniles could produce 
unintended, perverse consequences. 
 
Developmental science has played an important role in 
reshaping criminal justice policy toward juveniles in the last decade. 
Most notably, the Supreme Court decided a quartet of cases that insist 
that age matters in the application of criminal law and constitutional 
rights.
13
 Adolescent brain science and psychosocial research played a 
prominent role in those cases, providing an empirical footing for the 
idea that children are different from adults and require more protective 
rules that account for their immaturity and vulnerability. Consistent 
with this jurisprudence, this Article marshals the evidence regarding 
juvenile’s lesser deterrability to outline a developmental critique of 
DNA collection from juveniles.  
 
But this Article seeks to go a bit further. It argues that the basis 
for treating children differently from adults does not reside solely, or 
                                                                                                       
offenders for whom the deterrent force of the criminal law is likely to be, literally, an 
afterthought”). 
11
 Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 
53, 97 (2012) (discussing studies finding criminogenic effect of juvenile court 
processing); ANTHONY PETROSINO ET AL., FORMAL SYSTEM PROCESSING OF 
JUVENILES: EFFECTS ON DELINQUENCY, (Campbell Systematic Reviews, 2010) 
(finding in a comprehensive meta–analysis that juvenile system processing appears 
not to have a crime control effect but instead appears to increase delinquency across 
all measures). 
12
 See Bhati, supra note 9, at 50 (“offenders who have their DNA recorded in a 
database are likely to be rearrested and reconvicted quicker than” those who were 
not subject to DNA collection). 
13
 Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 (unconstitutional to impose capital punishment for crimes 
committed by someone under the age of eighteen); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2011, 2012 (2010) (outlawing life without parole sentences for individuals who 
committed non–homicide crimes under the age of eighteen); Miller v. Alabama, 132 
S.Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles 
violate the Eighth Amendment). That children are different from adults and require 
different rules is not limited to sentencing; See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 
2394, 2402 (2011) (age is a relevant factor when deciding whether an individual is in 
custody for purposes of providing a Miranda warning). 
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even predominantly, in science.
14
 Childhood is more complicated than 
that. Its contours are not necessarily set by empirical facts or common 
sense.
15
 In the last two decades, childhood studies scholars have 
critically explored the role of childhood in society.
16
 Writing 
predominantly in the fields of sociology, history, and education, these 
scholars have shown that in addition to being a natural fact, childhood 
is a social construct.
17
 It is the product of our collective imagination, 
reflecting prevailing societal priorities and aspirations.  
 
Like other social constructs, childhood is a category that is 
“defined, maintained, and regulated by law.”18 Careful attention to the 
conception of childhood can, and should, shape how the criminal law 
regulates children. Few legal scholars, however, have critically 
explored the implications of childhood as a social construct for the 
applicability of legal principles to children.
19
 Frank Zimring’s path–
                                            
14
 Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 
715, 736 (2013) (“Developmental facts do not dictate the contours or boundaries of 
childhood. Ideology does.”); See Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should 
Not) Learn from Child Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 13, 34 n.96, 
37–48, 49 & n.144 (2009) (arguing that the law should not “assign rights and 
responsibilities” in lockstep with “assessments of children’s capacities documented 
in the scientific research.”). 
15
 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2407 (“officers and judges need no imaginative powers, 
knowledge of developmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise 
in social and cultural anthropology to account for a child's age. They simply need the 
common sense to know that a 7–year–old is not a 13–year–old and neither is an 
adult.”). 
16
 Barrie Thorne, Crafting the Interdisciplinary Field of Childhood Studies, 14 
CHILDHOOD 147, 149–50 (2007). 
17
 Chris Jenks, Introduction: Constituting the Child, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
CHILDHOOD: ESSENTIAL READINGS 10–12 (Chris Jenks ed., 1982); Annette Ruth 
Appell, The Pre–Political Child of Child–Centered Jurisprudence, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 
703, 704 (2009) (“childhood . . . is a social construct that is contingent upon time 
and place”); Beth Colgan, Constitutional Line Drawing at the Intersection of 
Childhood and Crime, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 79, 81 (2013) (the divisions between 
juveniles and adults are “social constructions based on public perceptions regarding 
the maturity of juveniles to engage in or be responsible for a given action”). 
18
 DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 33 (2d ed. 2004); Appell, 
supra note 14, at 735. 
19
 Appell, supra note 14, at 715 (“the legal academy has bestowed scant critical 
examination on the category of childhood”); Annette Ruth Appell, The Pre-Political 
Child of Child-Centered Jurisprudence, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 703, 726 (2009) (Child–
centered jurisprudence has typically “not taken on, in a systematic way, structural 
Lapp   7/21/2014  2:45 PM 
2014]   COMPULSORY DNA COLLECTION 57 
 
 
 
breaking and critical scholarship on juvenile justice has done so for 
years, without the imprimatur of “childhood studies.”20 Currently, 
Annette Ruth Appell is leading the way in bringing the insights and 
approach of childhood studies to the law, though she has yet to explore 
the relationship between the concept of childhood and the criminal law 
at any length.
21
 Further engagement with childhood studies amongst 
children’s rights advocates and scholars will deepen our understanding 
of the role, and proper shape, of a distinct juvenile justice regime.  
 
This Article seeks to further this important conversation. It 
identifies the prevailing conception of childhood (as a separate, 
protected space for those whose development must be guarded and 
promoted), and explains the role that this conception has in shaping 
criminal justice policy regarding juveniles. Simply put, the modern 
conception of childhood demands (even more powerfully, perhaps, 
than the findings of adolescent brain science) that we not subject 
juveniles to compulsory DNA collection for purposes of databasing. 
At the very least, the aggregate collection of genetic data from 
juveniles cannot be justified as being in their best interests.  
 
The Article focuses on DNA collection following an 
adjudication of delinquency because of the resonance between the 
conception of childhood and the juvenile court, which was created to 
ensure that juveniles were treated separately from and differently than 
adults.
22
 Part I shows how legislatures and courts have embraced an 
                                                                                                       
questions about why and how the law creates and defines childhood, what purposes 
this designation serves, and why children are domesticated.”). 
20
 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE (2005); FRANK ZIMRING, 
THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, (1982). See also Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse, Youthful Indiscretions: Culture, Class Status, and the Passage to 
Adulthood, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 743 (2002) (critically exploring the notion of 
childhood behind the regulation of youth crime, describing an American tendency to 
differentiate between our own and other people’s children, and excuse the mistakes 
of our own offspring while labeling other people’s children as delinquents or 
criminals). 
21
 Appell, supra note 14, at 769–70 (offering preliminary thoughts in a short section 
on “youthful offenders”); Appell, supra note 17, at 726. 
22
 Miriam Van Waters, Youth In Conflict, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC, AND THE 
COURT 217 (1925) (the juvenile court “came into the world to prevent children from 
being treated as criminals.”); Franklin E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, 
in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 209–10 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin 
E. Zimring eds., 2000) (the policy of juvenile court is to punish offenders without 
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empirically unsupportable notion of juveniles’ best interests with 
regard to compulsory DNA collection. Part II then introduces the 
conception of childhood and the critical role it can and should play in 
setting juvenile justice policy.  
 
I. DNA COLLECTION FROM DELINQUENTS 
 
The federal government and 49 states compel DNA collection 
from juveniles as a result of contact with the criminal justice system.
23
 
A criminal conviction, an adjudication of juvenile delinquency, or an 
arrest can all trigger mandatory DNA collection.
24
 This Part details the 
law on DNA collection following a delinquency adjudication in 
juvenile court. It identifies a best–interest justification present in the 
animating legislation and case law upholding the practice, grounded in 
a belief in DNA collection’s deterrent and rehabilitative effect on 
juveniles. It then shows that there is little empirical evidence for such 
a claim. The available evidence, in fact, more strongly supports the 
contrary idea that DNA collection has no deterrent or rehabilitative 
effect on juveniles. It is possible, in fact, that DNA collection 
increases recidivism and negatively impacts the life–course of 
juveniles. 
 
                                                                                                       
permanently destroying long–term life chances and developmental opportunities). In 
a forthcoming work, I critically analyze DNA collection from juveniles as a 
consequence of criminal convictions and arrest, as well as DNA obtained from 
juveniles via consent. Kevin Lapp, As Though They Were Not Children: DNA 
Collection from Juveniles, 89 Tulane L. Rev. -- (forthcoming 2014). 
23
 JULIE E. SAMUELS, ET. AL., COLLECTING DNA FROM JUVENILES, iii (2011); 42 
U.S.C. § 14135a (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 28.12 (2006) (mandating the collection of DNA 
from anyone arrested for or facing federal charges, regardless of the charge). 
24
 Law enforcement increasingly collects genetic samples via consent–based cheek 
swabs, sometimes in exchange for dropping or reducing charges. See Elizabeth N. 
Jones and Wallace Wade, 'Spit and Acquit': Legal and Practical Ramifications of the 
DA's DNA Gathering Program, ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER MAGAZINE, Vol. 51, No. 
9, September 2009 (describing program that provides for the dismissal of felony 
drug charges if the individual voluntarily provides law enforcement with a genetic 
sample for purposes of DNA profiling); Andria Borba, Police Collect DNA from 
Middle–Schoolers in Murder Investigation, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2012, 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/04/police-collect-dna (describing 
detectives’ visit to Sacramento County middle–school to obtain DNA from 
juveniles, on their consent, in connection with a murder investigation). 
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Thirty states and the federal government compel DNA 
collection from juveniles based on a finding of juvenile delinquency. 
Federal law has the broadest DNA collection scheme. It mandates 
DNA collection from anyone (including juveniles) arrested, facing 
charges or convicted, regardless of the charge.
25
 Because federal DNA 
collection law does not distinguish between cases handled as a 
criminal or delinquent matter,
26
 and because federal law does not 
require a conviction before DNA collection is required, it does not 
matter to federal DNA collection whether a juvenile is charged as an 
adult and found guilty or charged with delinquency. Either way, 
federal law subjects any juvenile charged or convicted in federal court 
to compulsory DNA collection. 
 
State laws vary in the scope of their collection from juveniles 
following an adjudication of delinquency. Of the thirty states that 
collect DNA from juveniles processed in the juvenile justice system,
27
 
twenty–five collect from those juveniles adjudicated delinquent for 
legally specified qualifying offenses regardless of the punishment 
                                            
25
 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2006). Federal law initially prohibited DNA profiles 
of arrestees from being placed in CODIS. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1)(C) (2000) 
(amended 2006). In 2006, Congress significantly expanded DNA collection 
authorization to include arrestees. Adam Walsh Child Safety and Protection Act of 
2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, § 155, 120 Stat. 587, 611 (2006) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2006)). The Department of Justice issued a final 
rule in 2008 that directs federal agencies to collect DNA samples from individuals 
(including juveniles) who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted, regardless of the 
underlying charge or offense. 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(b) (2011). The final rule was 
effective January 9, 2009. 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(c). 
26
 Contrary to popular assumption, there are federal delinquency matters. The 
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act provides that federal courts can handles cases 
involving acts committed by those under 18 provided that the U.S. attorney certifies 
to the U.S. District Court that (1) the juvenile court or court of a state does not have 
jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction, (2) the state does not have available 
programs or services adequate for the needs of the juveniles, or (3) the offense 
charged is a felony crime of violence or specified drug offense and there is 
substantial federal interest in the case. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2006). 
27
 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey,  South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin. 
This excludes states that have “Youthful Offender” laws if the juvenile is processed 
exclusively in state criminal court. 
Lapp   7/21/2014  2:45 PM 
60  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 14:1 
 
imposed.
28
 Five states require a qualifying adjudication plus a 
qualifying sentence.
29
 Twenty states collect following an adjudication 
for any felony offense,
30
 with sixteen of those collecting for additional 
select misdemeanors.
31
 Ten collect for select felony adjudications,
32
 
with five of those collecting for additional select misdemeanors.
33
 All 
told, twenty–one states mandate DNA collection from juveniles 
adjudicated delinquent for certain misdemeanors.
34
 
 
DNA Collection Following Adjudication of Delinquency 
  
Felony Adjudication 
Misdemeanor 
Adjudication 
Federal 
Law 
All felonies All misdemeanors 
State Law 
20 states = all felonies 
10 states = subset of 
felonies 
21 states for certain 
misdemeanors 
 
DNA collection from juveniles adjudicated delinquent either tracks 
collection from adults convicted in criminal court, or is narrower.
35
 
                                            
28
 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. 
29
 California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Texas. 
30
 Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Virginia. 
31
 Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington.   
32
 KY. REV. STAT. § 17.170 (West 2009); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 25 § 1574 (2012); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 803.225a (West 1997); N.H. REV. STAT ANN. § 651-C:2 
(West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.20 (West 2013); ALA. CODE § 36-18-25 
(West 2009); ARK. CODE ANN. §12-12-1006 (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-6-
103 (West 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321 (West 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
973.047 (West 2010). 
33
 KY. REV. STAT. § 17.170 (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 803.225a (West 
1997); N.H. REV. STAT ANN. § 651-C:2 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1–20.20 (West 
2013). 
34
 Most are sexual or violent offenses.  See SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 7 Fig. 1 (26 
states list sexual offenses as qualifying offense, 13 states list violent offenses, and 6 
states list property offenses). 
35
 For several years, Wisconsin uniquely permitted a DNA collection regime from 
juveniles that was, in one regard, broader than DNA collection from adults. The 
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For example, Florida makes no distinction in its treatment of adults 
and juveniles, requiring DNA collection from “any person, including 
juveniles and adults” arrested for, convicted of or found delinquent of 
a felony offense.
36
 California’s DNA collection law treats equally 
adults and juveniles convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for any 
felony offense, but exempts juveniles from the law’s collection 
mandate for those arrested or charged with any felony offense.
37
 
Hawai’i stands alone in completely exempting juveniles from 
compulsory DNA collection.
38
 
 
There is no available data on how many juveniles have been 
compelled to provide a genetic sample for purposes of DNA profiling. 
A back–of–the–envelope estimate can be made based on a variety of 
figures. According to a 2011 Urban Institute report, ten states that 
provided data had a total of over 121,000 DNA profiles as of the end 
of 2008 that came from individuals who were juveniles at the time of 
collection, representing 6.2% of all DNA profiles uploaded by these 
states.
39
 Taking that ratio as a baseline, 6.2% of the current CODIS 
DNA profile database would be approximately 800,000 juvenile 
profiles.
40
 
                                                                                                       
Wisconsin statute required a juvenile adjudicated delinquent of fourth–degree sexual 
assault to provide a DNA sample even though neither adults nor juveniles waived 
into adult court and convicted of the same offense are required to provide a DNA 
sample. In re S.M.L., 705 N.W.2d 906, *5 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting an Equal 
Protection challenge to the state’s DNA collection law which mandates collection for 
juveniles convicted of a certain misdemeanor sex offense but did not compel 
collection from adults or juveniles waived into criminal court who were convicted of 
the same offense because the “state’s authority to control children is greater than the 
scope of its authority over adults”). The law was amended in 2005 to treat juveniles 
and adults the same. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.34 (West 2005).  
36
  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West 2013) (defining “qualifying offender” as “any 
person, including juveniles and adults” arrested for, convicted of or found delinquent 
of a felony offense in Florida or any similar offense in another jurisdiction). 
37
 CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 296 (West 2004). 
38
 HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D–31 (LEXIS 2006) (“Any person, except for any 
juvenile, who is convicted of, or pleads guilty or no contest to, any felony offense . . 
.  shall provide buccal swab samples . . . .”). 
39
 See SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 17. 
40
 CODIS-NDIS Statistics, LABOR SERVICES (Jan. 2014), http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics (indicating 10,971,392 
offender profiles, 1,892,952 arrestee profiles and 559,705 forensic profiles as of May 
2014 in the National DNA Index System). 
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An estimate of how many juveniles are subject to compulsory 
DNA collection annually can also be made from a variety of data 
sources. The number of federal delinquency matters is quite small. 
According to one recent study, federal courts handled 152 juveniles in 
2008, and 156 juveniles were admitted to federal prison jurisdiction in 
2008.
41
 States, however, are the biggest suppliers of DNA profiles. 
Some estimate that 200,000 youth under 18 are charged in criminal 
court per year, with approximately 100,000 of those charges resulting 
in convictions.
42
 The number of juveniles processed in juvenile courts 
nationwide is much larger. In 2008, courts with juvenile jurisdiction 
handled an estimated 1.65 million delinquency cases.
43
 Even if only 
five percent of those juveniles are required to provide a DNA sample, 
that would mean over 80,000 juveniles each year. Should DNA 
collection from arrestees continue to spread to more states,
44
 the 
potential numbers of juveniles subject to DNA collection would 
increase exponentially. In 2012, almost one million arrests of persons 
under age 18 were made in the United States.
45
 All told, as many as 
several hundred thousand juveniles could, each year, be required to 
provide a genetic sample for purposes of DNA profiling. 
 
Legislatures and courts have identified several rationales for 
compelling juveniles adjudicated delinquent to provide a DNA 
sample. Among them are the claim that DNA collection and profiling 
                                            
41
 MARK MOTIVANS & HOWARD SNYDER, SUMMARY: TRIBAL YOUTH IN THE 
FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1(U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
2011).  Federal law also compels collection from anyone arrested. 
42
 THE IMPACT OF PROSECUTING YOUTH IN THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 2 (UCLA School of Law Juvenile Justice Project, 
2010) (citing Jennifer L. Woolard et 
al., Juveniles within Adult Correctional Settings: Legal Pathways and 
Developmental Considerations, 4 INT'L J. OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 1, 4 
(2005)). David Chura, Prison is No Place to Grow Up: Why Every State Must Enact 
Juvenile Justice Reforms, YOUTHtoday. (Oct. 28, 2013), 
http://www.youthtoday.org/view_blog.cfm?blog_id=770. 
43
 JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS: 2008 6 (2011) (noting that juveniles court cases are 
up 43% since 1985, though down 12% from the peak of almost 1.9 million in 1997). 
44
 This is likely following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 
1 (2012) which upheld the constitutionality of compulsory pre–conviction DNA 
collection. 
45
 Uniform Crime Report, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES Tab. 36 (2012), 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2012/tables/36tabledatadecoverviewpdf. 
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serves the governmental purpose of accurately and efficiently 
identifying the person whose genetic material is seized,
46
 and that it 
helps solve crime.
47
 This Article focuses on the claim that DNA 
collection from juveniles adjudicated delinquent is in their best interest 
because it deters them from reoffending, thus promoting their 
rehabilitation. 
 
The “best interests of the child” standard was born in the 
English common law.
48
 It is “rooted in the concept of parens patriae 
and the authority of the state to protect those unable to protect 
themselves.”49 Predominant in the child welfare and custody context, 
the best interest of the child standard puts concern for the welfare of 
the child (her physical, mental, social and moral well–being) at the 
center of the government’s intervention in a juvenile’s life.50 The 
standard was the centerpiece of the juvenile court, which was created 
at the beginning of the twentieth century to handle juvenile matters 
separately from adults in a manner that promotes the best interests of 
children.
51
  
                                            
46
 See, e.g., State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah Cnty. v. Orozco, 878 P.2d 
432, 435 (Or. 1994) (DNA collected “to record the immutable characteristics of 
arrestees and offenders for use in the investigation of future crimes.”). 
47
 See, e.g., Petitioner F. v. Brown, 306 S.W.3d 80, 89 (Ky. 2010) (DNA database is 
“an investigative tool designed to provide law enforcement with additional 
information . . . to assist police in solving crimes where the perpetrator left DNA 
evidence.”).  
48
 Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 113, 119 (2009) (citing Blissets Case, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 889, 898 
(K.B.) (awarding custody to mother because it was “best for the child”). 
49
 Id. at 125. “Parens patriae” means the role of the state as sovereign and guardian 
of persons unable to care for themselves, such as juveniles. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009). 
50
 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 676 (Melvin M. Biglow ed., 13th ed. 1886) (“Parents are 
entrusted with the custody of the persons and then education of their children, yet 
this is done upon the natural presumption that the children will be properly taken 
care of . . . and that they will be treated with kindness and affection . . . . But 
whenever . . . a father . . . acts in a manner injurious to the morals or interests of his 
children—in every case, the Court of Chancery will interfere”). 
51
 See TANENHAUS, The Evolution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile Court, in THE 
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 18 (noting that the 
juvenile court was concerned with the social welfare of children, not assignment of 
criminal responsibility, and “used the doctrine of parens patriae to argue that 
benevolent state treatment of children was in their best interest”). 
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The best interest standard is frequently criticized as 
indeterminate, easily manipulated and subject to unconscious cultural 
biases.
52
 Critics view it as justifying state intervention and argue that it 
is often employed to serve adult interests in the name of child 
interests.
53
 Indeed, the freedom and discretion that the best–interest 
standard granted to juvenile court judges explained much of the sorry 
shape the juvenile court had taken by the 1960s.  Taking its first look 
at a juvenile court in the mid–1960s, the Supreme Court described it as 
“the worst of both worlds” – offering juveniles “neither the protections 
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment 
postulated for children.”54 
 
Despite the widespread and long–standing criticism of the best 
interest standard, it remains at the center of juvenile court decision–
making.
55
 As a result, it is no surprise that legislation and case law 
regarding compulsory DNA collection from juveniles adjudicated 
delinquent in juvenile court frame the practice as being in the best 
interests of juveniles. A careful look at just what legislators and judges 
                                            
52
 Robert Mnookin & R. Szwed, The Best Interests Syndrome and the Allocation of 
Power in Child Care, in PROVIDING CIVIL JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN 8 (H. Geach & E. 
Szwed, eds., 1983) (criticizing the best interest standard as “flawed because what is 
‘best for any child . . . is often indeterminate and speculative and requires a highly 
individualized choice between alternatives.’”); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: 
Against the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1987) (calling the 
best interest standard indeterminate, unjust, and subject to public policy concerns); 
(calling the best interest standard indeterminate, unjust, and subject to public policy 
concerns); Pamela Laufer–Ukles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the 
Law: Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 19 (2008) (noting 
that best interest considerations are “extremely broad and allow for the expression of 
particular judicial prejudice”). 
53
 Appell supra note 14, at 718–19, (noting “this nation’s long and ongoing history 
of substituting state interests for the wishes and interests of children” and explaining 
how the best interest standard “enhances state power when it deploys children’s 
interests to justify individually targeted and coercive intervention into the lives of 
poor and minority children and their families”); ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD 
SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY xliii, 3 (40th Anniv. Ed. 2009) (aiming to 
“destroy the myth that the child–saving movement was successful” and arguing that 
the Progressives “helped to create special judicial and correctional institutions for the 
labeling, processing and management of ‘troublesome’ youth” that “subjected more 
and more juveniles to arbitrary and degrading punishments.”). 
54
 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).  
55
 See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT LAW § 301.1 (McKinney 1983) (“in any 
proceeding under this article, the court shall consider the needs and best interests of 
the respondent as well as the need for protection of the community.”). 
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mean when they claim that compulsory DNA collection serves 
juveniles’ best interests reveals the emptiness, if not the 
erroneousness, of the claim. 
 
There are two components to the best interest justification for 
collecting DNA from juveniles: deterrence and rehabilitation. The 
enacting legislation in several states includes, for example, a finding 
that DNA databasing is “an important tool in deterring recidivist 
acts.”56 Courts frequently assert the same. The Ninth Circuit recently 
declared that the “mere existence of the DNA database creates a strong 
deterrent effect.”57 Likewise, the Illinois Supreme Court, without 
reference to any empirical evidence, heralded “the fact that collection 
and storage of DNA pursuant to our indexing statute has a deterrent 
and rehabilitative effect” in upholding compulsory DNA collection 
form juveniles adjudicated delinquent.
58
 The court then concluded that 
DNA collection from juveniles “advances, rather than conflicts with, 
the [deterrence and rehabilitative] goals of our Juvenile Court Act.”59 
A Wisconsin court found that DNA profiling of juveniles “respond[s] 
to juvenile offender’s needs for care and treatment, consistent with the 
prevention of delinquency.”60 In the most paternalistic decision, an 
Arizona appeals court characterized DNA databasing as consistent 
with the court’s role as a “protecting parent” because it “works in 
                                            
56
 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29–4102 (1997) (“The Legislature finds that DNA 
data banks are an important tool . . . in deterring and detecting recidivist acts”); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:602 (1999) (same);  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-1.5-1 (2002) 
(same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-2 (Westlaw 1994) (same); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 12–
12–1102 (1997) (same); 44 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2302 (West 2005) (same). 
57
 Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1064, reh'g en banc granted 686 F.3d 1121 (9th 
Cir. 2012). The First and Third Circuits have likewise declared that the collection of 
DNA "indirectly promote[s] the rehabilitation of criminal offenders by deterring 
them from committing crimes in the future." United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 
13 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 176 (3d Cir. 
2005)). 
58
 In re Lakisha M., 822 N.E.2d 570, 581 (Ill. 2008) (emphasis added). 
59
 Id. at 579; see also In re Calvin S., 58 Cal Rptr. 3d 559, 563 (Cal. App. 2007) (the 
rehabilitative goal of the juvenile court is “aided by DNA testing of juvenile 
felons”). 
60
 In re S.M.L., 287 Wis.2d 829, *4 (2005). 
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concert” with “the protection, treatment and guidance of children” by 
deterring future crime.
61
  
 
But what precisely do legislators and courts mean when they 
say that DNA databasing has a deterrent and rehabilitative effect? And 
is there evidence to support such a claim? The supposed rehabilitative 
impact of DNA collection can be dealt with quickly. As used by courts 
and legislators, rehabilitation does not describe anything separate from 
deterrence. Instead, they conflate rehabilitation with deterrence. For 
example, in ruling compulsory DNA collection following an 
adjudication of delinquency constitutional, the Oregon Supreme Court 
declared that “deterrence is an integral part of rehabilitation.”62 
 
Rehabilitation potentially describes something different from 
deterrence. Where deterrence operates to influence behavior out of 
knowledge of potential consequences,
63
 rehabilitation has broader 
aims. It seeks to help individuals make better choices irrespective of 
the punishment consequences of those choices.
64
 But there is nothing 
about DNA collection apart from deterrence that helps juveniles make 
better choices. Having their DNA in a government database searchable 
nationwide by law enforcement agencies does not help juveniles better 
identify right from wrong. Therefore, it does not make sense to 
consider rehabilitation as a distinct justification for compulsory DNA 
collection. If it rehabilitates juveniles at all, it does so because it deters 
unlawful behavior. 
                                            
61
 In the Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action Nos. JV–512600 & 
JV–512797, 930 P.2d 496, 501–02 (Ct. App. 1996) (DNA collection “further[s] the 
protective and rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court”). 
62
 State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah Cnty. v. Orozco, 878 P.2d 432, 438 (“if 
a convicted felon knows that those ‘leavings’ will reveal his or her identity and is 
therefore deterred from committing a crime, the rehabilitative process has begun.”). 
63
 VALERIE WRIGHT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING CERTAINTY 
VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT 2 (The Sentencing Project ed., 2010). 
64
 Francis T. Cullen & Paul Fendreau, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, 
Practice and Prospects, POLICIES, PROCESS AND DECISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 116 (quoting Declaration of Principles adopted and promulgated 
by the Congress in TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS ON PENITENTIARY 
AND REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE 541 (E.C. Wines ed., 1871) “the prisoner’s destiny 
should be placed, measurably, in his own hands. . . he must be put into 
circumstances where he will be able, through his own exertions, to continually better 
his own condition.”). 
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The deterrence argument for compulsory DNA collection 
consists itself of two different notions. First, the DNA database will 
make it easier for law enforcement to catch perpetrators whose DNA 
is in the database, and thus prevent their ability to commit additional 
crimes. This has been described as DNA collection’s probative 
effect.
65
 Courts have noted DNA collection’s probative effect as a 
justification for compelling collection following a juvenile court 
adjudication. As the Oregon Supreme Court put it, for the juvenile 
justice system to succeed, “it must send a message—consistent, loud, 
and clear—to the youthful offenders in this state who are bent on 
committing serious crimes, that one of the consequences for their 
misdeeds is that they will be more readily identified, if they commit 
other misdeeds in the future.”66 
 
While no court has ever cited any, there is evidence that DNA 
collection makes it easier to catch lawbreakers and to do so more 
quickly. According to one study, the probability of reoffending and 
being convicted for any offense is 23.4% higher for those with a 
profile in the DNA database than those without.
67
 At least one other 
study has found a net probative effect.
68
 But this is both unsurprising 
and primarily an incapacitation argument for reducing crime, not a 
deterrence one.
69
 By definition, those who DNA databasing make it 
                                            
65
 Bhati, supra note 9, at 11 (describing evidence that individuals whose profiles are 
in DNA databases who recidivate receive sanctions more quickly and with more 
certainty as the probative effect of DNA databasing).  
66
 Orozco, 878 P.2d at 438 (“If the system can teach these juveniles that there are 
consequences to their actions, that they will be held accountable, it will have served 
both them and society well.”); see also In re S.M.L., 705 N.W.2d 906, 4 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2005) (“Requiring juveniles adjudged delinquent of fourth–degree sexual 
assault to provide a DNA sample is rationally related to two stated goals of the 
Juvenile Justice Code.” Protect the public and “respond to juvenile offender’s needs 
for care and treatment, consistent with the prevention of delinquency.”). 
67
 Jennifer L. Doleac, The Effects of DNA Databases on Crime 16 (Dec. 2, 2012) 
(Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, Working Paper).  
68
 Bhati, supra note 9 at 50 (finding probative effects because “offenders who have 
their DNA recorded in a database are likely to be rearrested and reconvicted quicker 
than” those who were not subject to DNA collection). 
69
 See In re Lakisha M., 882 N.E.2d 570, 574 (Ill. 2008) (DNA collection can 
“increas[e] public safety through either deterrence or removal of criminal offenders 
from the streets”) (emphasis added). (quoting People v. Garvin, 847 N.E.2d 82, 92 
(Ill. 2006)). Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A 
Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 175 (2004) 
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easier to catch and punish for future crimes are continuing to offend, 
so their presence in the database did not deter them from reoffending. 
 
The second deterrent component of DNA collection is that 
those in the database, knowing that they are more easily identifiable, 
will choose not to commit crimes they otherwise would have 
committed had they not been subject to DNA collection.
70
  This is 
DNA collection’s specific deterrent effect.71 For there to be a specific 
deterrent effect, those subject to DNA collection should reduce their 
incidence of offending once their DNA profile is in the database. 
Given DNA collection’s probative value (it increases the chances of 
getting caught), it is plausible that those who know they are in the 
database would commit fewer crimes. On this aspect of deterrence, 
however, the evidence is weak. According to Sheldon Krimsky and 
Tonia Simoncelli, scientists and authors of a recent book on DNA 
databasing and criminal investigations, “currently there is no empirical 
evidence to support the often–stated claim that DNA databases deter 
crime.”72 
 
Two recent studies have concluded that there is a specific 
deterrent effect. In 2010, Avinash Bhati authored a Justice Policy 
Center report that found 2–3% reductions in recidivism risk 
attributable to specific deterrence for robbery and burglary resulting 
from DNA databasing.
73
 But Bhati also found increases in recidivism 
risk for other categories.
74
 In a working paper, Jennifer L. Doleac 
asserts that the net probative effects of DNA databasing “suggests that 
deterrence is playing a role,” but she did not make any specific 
specific deterrent calculation.
75
 Notably, in contrast to Bhati’s 
                                                                                                       
(suggesting that “much, if not most” studies which support a conclusion that doctrine 
affects crime rates “is the result of incapacitative rather than deterrent effects.”). 
70
 Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9
th
 Cir. 2012), reh'g granted, 686 F.3d 
1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (an individual is “less likely to commit another crime in the 
future if he knows that his DNA is catalogued in the State database.”).  
71
 Bhati, supra note 9, at 11 (specific deterrence means that individuals who would 
have re–offended choose not to re–offend to avoid receiving the swifter and more 
certain punishment brought about by DNA databasing). 
72
 Krimsky, supra note 9, at 148. 
73
 Bhati, supra note 9, at 7. 
74
 Id. (noting increases in recidivism risk for “violent [crimes], property [crimes,] 
and other” crimes). 
75
 Doleac, supra note 68, at 17. Doleac also added that “effect of DNA profiling 
varies with offenders’ age and criminal history”, 16, and it is “unlikely that the effect 
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findings, Doleac found that “robbery and burglary rates are not 
significantly changed” by larger databases.76 Moreover, that violent 
offenders in the DNA database were more likely to return to prison 
than similar offenders not in the DNA database suggested to Doleac 
that “the higher probability of getting caught outweighs any deterrent 
effect of DNA profiling.”77 That is, DNA collection does a better job 
of catching those subject to it who reoffend than it does in deterring 
those subject to it from reoffending.  
 
There are several reasons why a weak, or absent, specific 
deterrent finding makes sense despite the intuitive appeal of the 
deterrence claim. One is that the law and economics, rational–actor 
foundation of deterrence is more theory than reality. As Paul Robinson 
and John Darley put it, having a criminal justice system deters, but the 
criminal law—the substantive rules governing the distribution of 
criminal liability and punishment—does not materially affect 
deterrence.
78
 Another is that the deterrent effect of DNA databasing is 
overwhelmed or irrelevant to particular kinds of offending. Presence in 
a DNA database is unlikely to deter crime committed amongst those 
who know one another (where there will be no dispute as to the 
identity of the alleged assailant) or crime that occurs as a result of 
social, situational or chemical influences that overwhelm any cost–
benefit analysis regarding violation rather than compliance.
79
 Since 
these situations cover a significant bulk of crime, DNA collection is 
unlikely to show a deterrent effect.
80
 Additionally, offenders may 
know that DNA evidence is not collected at the majority of crime 
scenes, and thus do not change their behavior after having their DNA 
profile entered into a database. Finally, some have suggested that 
                                                                                                       
[she found] will be linear as governments add more minor offenders (or non–
offenders) to the database.” Id., at 26. 
76
 Id. at 22. 
77
 Id. at 1. 
78
 Robinson & Darley, supra note 70, at 173. 
79
 Id. at 174 (“even if they know the legal rules and perceive a cost–benefit analysis 
that urges compliance, potential offenders commonly cannot or will not bring such 
knowledge to bear to guide their conduct in their own interests, such failure 
stemming from a variety of social, situational, or chemical influences.”). 
80
 Krimsky, supra note 9, at 149. 
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DNA collection changes the way people offend via forensic avoidance 
practices more than it deters criminality.
81
  
 
It is not just the uncertain evidence that DNA databasing 
provides any specific deterrent benefits that undermines the deterrence 
rationale for DNA collection from juveniles. Additional damage 
comes from the ample evidence that juveniles are, as a rule, less 
deterrable than adults.
82
 As a result, whatever specific deterrent effect 
DNA databasing may offer is significantly diminished, if not lost 
entirely, with respect to juveniles. 
 
Adolescent brain research and social scientists have 
demonstrated three distinguishing characteristics of adolescence that 
undermine the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions: risk perception, 
peer influence, and future discounting.
83
 First, juveniles perceive and 
assess risk differently than do adults. Juveniles both seek out risky 
behavior, including unlawful behavior, and underestimate the riskiness 
of unlawful behavior by underestimating the risks of getting caught 
and the certainty of punishment.
84
 Their risk–seeking tendencies and 
                                            
81
 Eric Beauregard & Martin Bouchard, Cleaning Up Your Act: Forensic Awareness 
as a Detection Avoidance Strategy, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 1160, 1160 (2010) (finding that 
some offenders take forensic precautions to avoid leaving biological evidence).  
82
 Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Social Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile 
Crime Regulation, 71 LA. L. REV. 35, 60 (Fall 2010) (“at a minimum, [current] 
research provides no support for the contention that criminal punishment will 
effectively reduce recidivism [amongst juveniles]. Indeed, almost all of the rather 
sparse empirical evidence points to the conclusion that it does not have this effect); 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS 
37–38 (1978) (“Our capacity to nip criminal careers in the bud is either trivial or 
nonexistent.”). 
83
 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 83, at 63 (“due to their psychosocial immaturity, teens 
on the street deciding whether to hold up a convenience store may simply be less 
capable than adults of considering the sanctions they will face.”); Brief for the 
American Psychological Association, et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
at 3–4, Graham v. State of Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) 
(“Juveniles – including older adolescents – are less able to restrain their impulses 
and exercise self–control; less capable than adults of considering alternative courses 
of action and maturely weighing risks and rewards; and less oriented to the future 
and thus less capable of apprehending the consequences of their often–impulsive 
actions.”). 
84
 Scott, supra note 1, 40–43 (adolescents differ from adults in their evaluation of 
risk, demonstrating a tendency to seek more novelty and to attach greater value to 
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their reduced capacity to perceive risk have obvious implications for 
deterrence policies, which are premised on a person’s ability to 
properly weigh the benefits of engaging in unlawful behavior against 
the expected likelihood of getting caught and the ensuing costs of 
punishment.
85
 As a result, even though DNA databasing increases the 
likelihood of getting caught for unlawful behavior, juveniles are 
unlikely to rationally include that in their risk assessment calculus.  
 
The second characteristic of adolescence that undermines the 
deterrent justification for DNA databasing is juveniles’ greater 
discounting of the future. “Generally, adolescents tend to focus more 
on short–term consequences and less on the long–term impact of a 
decision or behavior.”86  Therefore, even when juveniles recognize 
that there is a risk of getting caught and a risk of certain punishment, 
they discount that side of the ledger because of its distance from the 
now.  
 
A third characteristic of adolescence that diminishes any 
specific deterrent effect of DNA databasing is juvenile’s greater 
susceptibility to peer influence.
87
 This susceptibility to peer influence 
leads juveniles to “impetuous and ill–considered actions and 
decisions,”88 even when they have successfully recognized the risks of 
the behavior, and even if they have not discounted the long–term 
impacts of their decision. This characteristic of adolescence, too, has 
obvious implications for a deterrence justification for DNA collection. 
As Frank Zimring recognized, “[i]gnoring the well–known fact of 
group involvement causes us to . . . generate inaccurate models of 
deterrence.”89 Again, whatever deterrent effect DNA databasing may 
                                                                                                       
the potential rewards that risk–taking provides, especially in group settings); 
Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk–taking, 
28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78 (2008). 
85
 Christopher Slobogin, Mark Fondacaro, & Jennifer Woolard, A Prevention Model 
of Juvenile Justice: The Promise of Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 WIS. L. 
REV. 185, 197 (1999) (“Adolescents appear to calculate the risks of getting caught 
and punished differently than adults; that is, they do not assess the certainty of 
punishment in the same way adults would, or indeed as they themselves would once 
they become adults.”). 
86
 Id.  
87
 Zimring, supra note 20, at 73–74 (“adolescents commit crimes, as they live their 
lives, in groups.”). 
88
 Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993). 
89
 Zimring, supra note 20, at 73–74. 
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have is overwhelmed in the critical moment when juveniles make the 
decision to offend by the combination of their tendency to offend in 
groups and their susceptibility to peer influence. 
 
These characteristics of adolescents, individually and 
collectively, significantly diminish any deterrent effect of the criminal 
law on juveniles.
90
 As juvenile law experts Christopher Slobogin and 
Mark Fondacaro put it, the traits that mark adolescents tend to produce 
offenders “for whom the deterrent force of the criminal law is likely to 
be, literally, an afterthought.”91  
 
These findings on juvenile deterrability are widely accepted 
and have been recognized by courts across the country. In Roper v. 
Simmons, the Supreme Court stated that “the same characteristics that 
render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles 
will be less susceptible to deterrence.”92 It added that “the lesser 
deterability of juveniles is not offense or sentence specific; . . . 
juveniles are presumably relatively less likely to be deterred by any 
specific criminal punishment.”93 
 
Despite the widespread acceptance of the limited deterrability 
of juveniles, only a couple of courts have recognized it when 
discussing DNA collection. In addressing the constitutionality of DNA 
collection from juveniles convicted or adjudicated delinquent, a New 
Jersey appellate court acknowledged “the inefficacy of deterrent 
measures directed against children who have limited understanding.”94 
Nevertheless, the court “conclude[d] that this Act establishes a 
                                            
90
 Slobogin, supra note 86, at 196 (“[T]he literature regarding risk perception and 
preference, temporal perspective, the effects of peer influence, and what might be 
called ‘stake–in–life’ research . . . [all] suggest that the average adolescent, typically 
defined as a youth up to eighteen, differs from the average adult in ways that 
diminish willingness to pay attention to criminal law.”). 
91
 Slobogin, supra note 10, at 44; see Scott & Steinberg, supra note 83, at 56 (“the 
research on the general deterrent effect of legal regulation on juvenile crime is sparse 
and gives no clear answer to the question of whether . . . punitive measures reduce 
juvenile crime”). 
92
 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).  
93
 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK, A PLEA 
FOR PREVENTIVE JUSTICE, 47 (2011); See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); 
Miller v. Alabama 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). 
94
 A.A. ex rel. B.A. v. Attorney Gen. of New Jersey, 894 A.2d 31, 50 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2006), aff'd, 914 A.2d 260 (N.J. 2007). 
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database and databank that further the state's compelling interest in 
deterring and detecting recidivist acts of prior offenders, at least when 
applied to adult and juvenile offenders over the age of fourteen.”95 
There is nothing in the deterrence data on adolescents, however, to 
suggest that 14 is an age that matters. To the contrary, the 
characteristics of youth that make juveniles less deterrable last until 
the early twenties.
96
 
 
A Texas appellate court was also cautious on the deterrent 
effect of DNA databases, though apparently for strategic reasons. In 
addressing a claim that DNA collection following an adjudication of 
delinquency violated the ex post facto clause,
97
 the court noted that a 
DNA databank may deter recidivism on the part of convicted 
persons.
98
 The court nevertheless clarified that the legislatively stated 
purpose of the statute is identification, not deterrence, and stated that 
the threat of submitting to a blood draw and DNA databasing “does 
not, in itself, seem significant enough to deter possible offenders from 
committing sex offenses.”99 By diminishing any deterrent effect of 
DNA collection, the court could conclude that the DNA statute was 
not criminal in effect and thus reject the ex post facto challenge to it. 
Apart from these two instances, no other court has recognized 
juveniles’ lesser deterrability in its analysis. 
 
In sum, legislators and courts have defended compulsory DNA 
collection from juveniles adjudicated delinquent because doing so 
serves a deterrent purpose in line with the purpose of the juvenile 
court. There is little evidence, however, that DNA databasing provides 
a specific deterrent effect. Moreover, whatever deterrent value it does 
                                            
95
 Id. 
96
 Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and 
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 
LAW & INEQ. 263, 286 (2013) (“The human brain does not mature until the early 
twenties”); Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and 
Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self–Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems 
Model, 44 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1764, 1764 (2008); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence 
Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 815–16 (2003). 
97
 Appellants complained that the DNA collection statute applicable to them became 
effective after the date of their offenses and after they had accepted adjudications 
and dispositions in their cases. In re D.L.C. et al., 124 S.W.3d 354, 361–62 (Tex. 
App. 2003). 
98
 Id. at 367. 
99
 Id. (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.143(a) (2005)). 
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provides is significantly diminished with regard to juveniles. They 
assess risk differently, are more subject to peer influence, and discount 
the future more than adults, all of which reduce any deterrent effect 
derived from the increased likelihood of getting caught in the future or 
suffering punishment created by DNA databasing. As a result, 
deterrence (and rehabilitation) fails as a defensible justification for 
compulsory DNA collection from juveniles. Therefore, legislators and 
courts must abandon this best interest of the child justification for 
compulsory DNA collection from juveniles. 
 
II. THE CONCEPT OF CHILDHOOD AND DNA DATABASING 
 
Part I refuted the best–interest justification for compulsory 
DNA collection from juveniles, primarily by identifying adolescent 
brain science and psychosocial research findings that reject the notion 
that DNA databasing will deter juveniles from reoffending and 
promote their rehabilitation. Similar arguments from scientific 
findings have led in the last decade to the end of other criminal law 
practices that treated juveniles the same as adults.
100
  These cases, and 
the scholarly output they have triggered, reflect a renewed emphasis 
on the idea that children are different from adults, and that their 
differences require expanded protections for children.
101
 Some, 
                                            
100
 Miller v. Alabama 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (finding mandatory life without 
parole sentences for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment); J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2405 (2011) (“Neither officers nor courts can reasonably 
evaluate the effect of objective circumstances . . .  without accounting for the age of 
the child subjected to those circumstances.”); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 
2034 (2010) (outlawing life without parole sentences for individuals who committed 
non-homicide crimes under the age of eighteen); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
578 (2005) (finding capital punishment for crimes committed by someone under the 
age of eighteen unconstitutional). 
101
 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 29–30; Lawrence Steinberg, Should the 
Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy?, 64 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 739, 742 (2009); Marsha L. Levick & Elizabeth-Ann Tierney, The 
United States Supreme Court Adopts a Reasonable Juvenile Standard in J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina for Purposes of the Miranda Custody Analysis: Can a More 
Reasoned Justice System for Juveniles Be Far Behind?, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
501, 504 (2012) (showing that “developmental differences between children and 
adults ultimately led to the recognition in J.D.B. that a reasonable juvenile standard 
was required” and arguing that “the reasonable juvenile standard has application in 
several other areas of the criminal law beyond the Fifth Amendment context . . .”).  
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however, have cautioned against making too much of the science.
102
 
As Professor Emily Buss put it, the law should not “assign rights and 
responsibilities” in lockstep with “assessments of children’s capacities 
documented in the scientific research.”103  
 
The emphasis on developmental research in Part I was not 
meant to inextricably link juvenile policy to scientific findings. While 
the science is consistent and convincing, the science is not the last or 
the loudest word. This Part asserts that the basis for treating children 
differently from adults with regards to DNA databasing does not 
reside solely, or even predominantly, in science. Instead, drawing on 
the work of childhood studies scholars, it argues that a robust rationale 
for ending genetic databasing following a juvenile delinquency 
adjudication can be found in the constructed category of childhood.  
 
Childhood studies involve the critical exploration of the role of 
childhood in society.
104
 Childhood studies emphasizes that childhood 
is both a natural fact and a social construction, and an essential and 
permanent component of the social order.
105
 Every society recognizes 
the concept of childhood.
106
 This is not surprising, since childhood is a 
natural fact: children’s bodies and brains are not yet fully 
developed.
107
 Childhood is simultaneously a social construct. That is, 
                                            
102
 Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 765, 767 (2011) (“[T]he Graham Court gave [developmental 
nuerosicence] the maximum weight it presently can bear” and “temptation to place 
even greater weight on [it] should . . . be resisted”); Terry A. Maroney, The False 
Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
89, 93 (2009). 
103
 See Buss, supra note 14, at 13, 34 n.96, 37–48, 49 & n.144. 
104
 See Thorne, supra note 16, 149–50 (2007) (describing childhood studies). 
Drawing on John Rawls’ work in A Theory of Justice, childhood studies scholars 
have explained that having a concept of childhood means simply recognizing that 
children differ from adults in some way. ARCHARD, supra note 18, at 27. Every 
society recognizes the concept of childhood but having a conception of childhood, 
on the other hand, “is to have a view of what those interesting differences are.” Id. 
105
 Chris Jenks, Introduction: Constituting the Child, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
CHILDHOOD: ESSENTIAL READINGS 10–11 (Chris Jenks ed., 1982); Lourdes Gaitán 
Muñoz, La nueva sociología de la infancia: Aportaciones de una mirada distinta 
[The New Sociology of Childhood:Contributions from a Different Approach], 43 
POLÍTICA Y SOCIEDAD 9, 10 (2006) (Spain). 
106
 ARCHARD, supra note 18, at 31. 
107
 Brief for the American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Graham v. State of Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-
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childhood is a contingent category whose boundaries are not inevitable 
or fixed, but are instead defined and maintained by law.
108
 Societies 
can define childhood expansively or restrictively, and use any number 
of bases for setting the boundaries. 
 
Not surprisingly, conceptions of childhood have differed over 
space and time.
109
 For centuries, the defining difference between 
children and adults lay in physical differences in size and strength.
110
 
John Locke conceived of children as imperfect beings whose 
distinguishing characteristic was not their physical immaturity but 
their lack of the ability to reason.
111
 After the rise of industrialization, 
                                                                                                       
7621) (“[R]ecent neuroscience research shows that adolescent brains are not yet fully 
developed in regions related to higher–order executive functions such as impulse 
control, planning ahead, and risk evaluation.”). 
108
 Appell, supra note 14, at 735; ARCHARD, supra note 18, at 33 (“[T]he basis upon 
which childhood is seen essentially to differ from adulthood may be no more than a 
reflection of prevailing social priorities.”). The expressive function of the law then 
feeds back the law’s definition of childhood to society, shaping or reinforcing 
popular views of childhood. Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 
1116 (2012). 
109
 Jens Qvortrup, Childhood Matters: An Introduction, in CHILDHOOD MATTERS: 
SOCIAL THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLITICS 6–7 (Jens Qvortrup et al. eds., 1994) 
(noting that the definition of childhood varies over time, space, and culture). Even 
within a particular society, childhood can be constructed differently in different 
areas. Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633). In the United States, for 
example, maturity can be achieved at age 7 (age of criminal responsibility, can be 
prosecuted in criminal court), age 16 (driving), age 18 (voting and serving in the 
military), or age 21 (drinking alcohol). Id. 
110
 Both legend and Congress have it that the age of majority was set as a bright-line 
rule at twenty-one by common law courts in the Thirteenth Century because 
Englishmen were eligible for knighthood only upon achieving 21 years of age, when 
they could be expected to carry a full suit of armor. T.E. James, The Age of Majority, 
4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 22, 26 (1960); S. REP. NO. 92–96, at 5 (1971). 
111
 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 322, 324 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (“Children . . . are not born in this full state of 
Equality, though they are born to it . . . . Age and Reason as they grow up, loosen 
[the bonds of dependency] till at length they drop quite off, and leave a Man at his 
own free Disposal . . . . The Power, then, that Parents have over their Children, 
arises from that Duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their Off–spring, 
during the imperfect state of Childhood.”). 
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the modern American conception of childhood as marked by 
vulnerability and dependence took hold.
112
  
 
The modern view of childhood is complicated. Children are 
seen as both in need of protection and autonomous beings. Childhood 
is understood as both a training period that should not have permanent, 
debilitating consequences, and a time when individuals must 
understand and face the consequences for their actions. The dominant 
conception of childhood in the law, however, is as “a protected space 
separated from . . . the broader adult society.”113 It presumes an 
“inherent dependency, incapacity, and incompetence of the young and 
their need for adult care and protection”114 Children need such 
protection because they are “unreliable decisionmakers who are unable 
to project into the future, are subject to peer pressure, and possess poor 
impulse control.”115 Protective rules thus “aim to shepherd children 
into a self–sufficient, democratic, productive, and autonomous 
adulthood.”116  
 
This modern conception of children as vulnerable beings in 
need of separate, protective rules  holds even, or perhaps especially so, 
for juveniles who break the law. Indeed, that notion is the bedrock of a 
separate, supportive juvenile court. Born during the Progressive Era, 
the juvenile court “came into the world to prevent children from being 
treated as criminals.”117 It protected juveniles from the criminal 
                                            
112
 Appell, supra note 17, at 749 (“[I]mmaturity and vulnerability . . . [both 
physically and psychologically] became the defining social and economic aspects of 
childhood.”). 
113
 Paula S. Fass & Michael Grossberg, Preface, in REINVENTING CHILDHOOD AFTER 
WORLD WAR II ix (Paula S. Fass & Michael Grossberg eds., 2012); ARCHARD, supra 
note 18, at 37 (“[T]he most important feature of the way in which the modern age 
conceives of children is as meriting separation from the world of adults.”). It is “a 
time–limited developmental category . . . .” Appell, supra note 17. 
114
 Michael Grossberg, Liberation and Caretaking: Fighting over Children’s Rights 
in Postwar America, in Reinventing Childhood After World War II 19, 29 (Paula S. 
Fass & Michael Goldberg eds., 2012). 
115
 Appell, supra note 17, at 709. 
116
 Id.; ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 18–19 (“Above almost all else, we seek a legal 
policy that preserves the life chances for those who make serious mistakes . . . [and 
that gives] young law violators the chance to survive our legal system with their life 
opportunities still intact.”). 
117
 Waters, supra note 22. 
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process and its severe punishments and stigma,
118
 replacing 
adversarialness and procedural formality with judicial discretion and 
cooperative, individualized treatment that preferred rehabilitation and 
training over punishment.
119
 Moreover, the juvenile court 
accomplished its mission with greater confidentiality for the juveniles 
involved, and without saddling juveniles with a permanent criminal 
record.
120
  
 
It is not implausible, therefore, that compulsory DNA 
collection from juveniles adjudicated delinquent would be consistent 
with the best–interest aims of the juvenile court. If DNA collection 
helped steer juveniles away from a life of crime and responded to their 
need for supportive services, it would arguably serve their best 
interests. But as shown above, that conclusion depends on false 
notions of juveniles’ deterrability. Moreover, it is based on a view of 
children as rational and mature, as not needing protection from, and as 
freely and appropriately subject to, the same consequences for 
involvement with criminal justice as adults. This conception of 
childhood is at odds with the modern conception. And it is at odds 
with the Supreme Court’s recent decisions that remind us that children 
are children and that they require protective treatment under the 
criminal law. 
 
The better conclusion from the prevailing conception of 
childhood is that juveniles should not be subject to compulsory DNA 
                                            
118
 Zimring, supra note 22, at 209–10 (stating the policy of juvenile court is to 
punish offenders without permanently destroying long-term life chances and 
developmental opportunities); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 
104, 109 (1909) (“To get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt with as a 
criminal; to save it from the brand of criminality, the brand that sticks to it for life; to 
take it in hand and instead of first stigmatizing and then reforming it, to protect it 
from the stigma,––this is the work which is now being accomplished by . . .” the 
juvenile court); DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 25 (2004); 
BEN B. LINDSEY & HARVEY J. O’HIGGINS, THE BEAST 85 (1910) (stating the 
criminal prosecution of youth was an “outrage against childhood, against society, 
against justice, decency and common sense.”). Not all scholars see the Progressives 
in the same light—some use “child savers” more derisively—and argue that 
Progressives sought to control children and assimilate immigrant children. PLATT, 
supra note 53, at 43–44. 
119
 Mack, supra note 119, at 118–20 (stating a juvenile brought into the court should 
“be made to feel that he is the object of its care and solicitude.”). 
120
 PLATT, supra note 53, at 137–38. 
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collection following an adjudication of delinquency. At least three 
reasons support that conclusion. First, juveniles should not be 
compelled to provide DNA samples for purposes of databasing 
because children, as children, require different treatment from the 
criminal law. After more than two decades of increasingly treating 
children involved in the criminal justice system like adults,
121
 the 
pendulum has shifted back to special protections for children in the 
criminal law.
122
 This trend, consistent with the modern conception of 
childhood as a separate, protected space, reinforces the necessity of 
preserving the line between children and adults.
123
 The very category 
of childhood exists as a counter–position to adulthood.124 Children 
cannot simply be viewed as miniature adults,
125
 governed by the same 
laws imposing the same consequences for misbehavior, or the notion 
of childhood collapses. As Justice Frankfurter put it long ago, 
                                            
121
 Legislatures allowed juvenile courts to mete out ever more punitive sanctions. See 
BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE 
COURT 246 (1999) (“[S]tates’ juvenile court jurisprudence, sentencing laws, policies, 
and practices have become increasingly more punitive”); Kristin Henning, What’s 
Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive Versus Rehabilitative 
Systems of Justice, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1113 (2009) (“[C]ontemporary law–and–
order policies make it easier for prosecutors to transfer juveniles to adult court, 
create presumptions for detaining youth pending trial, impose mandatory minimum 
sentences for juveniles, lift the protective veil of confidentiality in juvenile 
proceedings, and require juveniles to register in sex–offender databases.”). 
Legislatures made it easier to avoid the jurisdiction of juvenile court and process and 
punish juveniles in criminal court. See Robert O. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory 
and Practice, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF 
ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 45, 52 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. 
Zimring eds., 2000). And the Supreme Court refused to extend or recognize special 
protections for youth. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667 (2004) 
(rejecting the argument that failure to consider a juvenile suspect’s age in 
determining custody for Miranda purposes clearly violated federal law); see also 
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 255, 281 (1984) (upholding pretrial detention of an 
accused juvenile delinquent based on finding that there was “serious risk” that 
juvenile “may before the return date commit an act which if committed by an adult 
would constitute a crime”). 
122
 See supra note 101. 
123
 Scott & Steinberg, supra note 84, at 80 (“[R]egulation grounded in scientific 
knowledge of adolescence is more likely to prevent juvenile crime and reduce its 
social cost than an approach that ignores differences between juveniles and adults”). 
124
 Appell, supra note 14, at 720 (“Treating children the same as adults . . . 
challenge[s] both adulthood and childhood . . . .”). 
125
 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011) (citing Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982)). 
Lapp   7/21/2014  2:45 PM 
80  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 14:1 
 
“[c]hildren have a very special place in life which law should reflect. 
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to 
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a 
State’s duty towards children.”126 It should, therefore, make us pause 
when the genetic databanking consequences of a juvenile court 
adjudication are the same as that of a criminal conviction. 
 
The second reason that the modern conception of childhood 
rejects DNA databasing of juvenile delinquents is that databasing 
conflicts with a separate, protective regime for juveniles. Treating 
juveniles who authorities have decided to process in juvenile court just 
like adult criminals is particularly discordant with the modern 
conception of childhood, and the juvenile court, as a separate, 
protected space.
127
 The decision by the government to proceed in 
juvenile court instead of adult court is a decision that matters. It 
reflects a conclusion that the alleged behavior does not warrant the 
serious consequences or permanent record that come with a criminal 
conviction. Instead, by proceeding in juvenile court, the government 
has chosen to intervene and impose appropriate sanctions while also 
helping the juvenile avoid further entanglement with the criminal 
justice system. Making a juvenile court adjudication a trigger for DNA 
databasing is a punitive, crime–control scheme.128 That most juveniles 
age out of crime, and do not recidivate,
129
 further underscores the 
inappropriateness of genetic databasing as a consequence of a juvenile 
adjudication. 
 
                                            
126
 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
127
 Waters, supra note 22. 
128
 State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t. of Multnomah Cnty. v. Orozco, 878 P.2d 432, 438 
(Or. Ct. App. 1994) (“If the juvenile justice system is ever to succeed, it must send a 
message—consistent, loud, and clear—to the youthful offenders in this state who are 
bent on committing serious crimes, that one of the consequences for their misdeeds 
is that they will be more readily identified, if they commit other misdeeds in the 
future. If the system can teach these juveniles that there are consequences to their 
actions, that they will be held accountable, it will have served both them and society 
well.”). 
129 Many estimate that only about five percent of adolescent offenders 
persist in criminal behavior into adulthood. See, e.g., SCOTT & STEINBERG, 
supra note 1, at 53. Terrie Moffitt, Life Course Persistent versus Adolescent-
Limited Antisocial Behavior in DANTE CICCHETTI AND DONALD COHEN, 
EDS. DEVELOPMENT PSYCHOPATHOLOGY VOL. 3 2nd ed.(2006). 
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The third reason to end DNA databasing following a 
delinquency adjudication is that rather than rehabilitating or deterring 
juveniles, DNA databasing actually risks making things worse for 
juveniles. As childhood studies scholar David Archard noted, 
“[c]hildren suffer specific (and often greater) harms as children and,  . 
. . are more likely to suffer them because they are children.”130 
Childhood scholar Annette Ruth Appell similarly remarked that 
“[u]nlike other subordinated groups, children will outgrow their 
subordination as children; but whether they will be subordinated as 
adults depends very much on their childhood.”131  
 
Recall that Jennifer Doleac found that DNA profiling has a 
particularly large net probative effect for young offenders (that is, it 
makes it easier to catch them more frequently and more quickly)
132
 
While this might initially support DNA profiling of juveniles—
offending peaks in late adolescence,
133
 making DNA collection from 
juveniles a plausible priority—there is a darker side to it at odds with 
the subject juvenile’s best interests. Research has demonstrated that 
involvement in the juvenile justice system “is associated with an 
increased likelihood of offending behavior.”134 This has led some to 
conclude that “contact with the youth justice system is inherently 
criminogenic.”135  
 
To the extent that this is true, DNA collection from juveniles 
may achieve the opposite of its goals. By placing subject juveniles in 
the pool of the usual suspects, DNA databasing increases the 
likelihood of their detection and punishment, which itself may 
increase recidivism. As one researcher observed, “catching [young 
                                            
130
 ARCHARD, supra note 18, at 61. 
131
 Appell, supra note 20, at 706. 
132
 Doleac, supra note 68, at 25. 
133
 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK: A PLEA 
FOR PREVENTIVE JUSTICE ix (2011) (stating people under 18 commit between 15–
20% of all crime in the U.S.). 
134
 Lesley McAra & Susan McVie, Youth Justice? The Impact of System Contact on 
Patterns of Desistance from Offending, 4 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 315, 318 (2007); 
Holly A. Wilson & Robert D. Hoge, The Effect of Youth Diversion Programs on 
Recidivism: A Meta-Analytic Review, 40 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 497, 514 (2013) 
(collecting studies). 
135
 Lesley McAra & Susan McVie, Youth Justice? The Impact of System Contact on 
Patterns of Desistance from Offending, 4 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 315, 318 (2007). 
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offenders] more quickly and more often when they commit new 
crimes could produce a cohort of more hardened criminals.”136 This is 
hardly in the juvenile’s, or anyone’s, best interests. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For more than a century, juvenile courts have provided 
juveniles specialized treatment in a separate forum motivated by the 
desire to promote juveniles’ best interests. Legislatures and courts 
have declared that seizing juveniles’ genetic material and databasing it 
after an adjudication of delinquency serves juveniles’ best interests 
because it deters them from future crime and promotes their 
rehabilitation. But there is little evidence to support such a claim, and 
good reason to doubt it.  
 
It is not just scientific findings that undermine the claim that 
DNA databasing is in the best interests of a juvenile who has been 
adjudicated delinquent. The concept of childhood itself, and its 
purpose and meaning in modern society, further undermine a regime 
that imposes the same permanent consequences for juveniles as it does 
for adults convicted in criminal court. Indeed, the prevailing 
conception of childhood (as a protected space for those whose 
development must be guarded and promoted because of their 
vulnerabilities) demands that we not subject juveniles to compulsory 
DNA collection for purposes of databasing based on a finding of 
juvenile delinquency.  
 
Understanding childhood as a social construct makes it 
possible, and coherent, to untether the rules for children from scientific 
facts. Protective rules governing children can be justified not because 
the science supports it, but based on what we want the experience, 
purpose and meaning of childhood to be.
137
 When the science and the 
                                            
136
 Doleac, supra note 68, at 26 (noting that when young offenders “have little (non–
criminal) human capital in the form of education, employment experience, or ties to 
friends and family to rely on when they are released”). 
137
 Appell, supra note 14, at 740 (“[T]he existence of a legal category for children as 
well as its boundaries and the rights of and duties owed to children are not nature’s 
law, but ‘political choices’ . . . . [T]he category of childhood is comprised of a set of 
value judgments and decisions about human beings between birth and eighteen; and 
about what it means to be a child and what it means to be an adult . . . .”). The 
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concept agree, as they do here, laws that impose a different result beg 
careful assessment.  
 
 
                                                                                                       
expressive function of the law then feeds back the law’s definition of childhood to 
society, shaping or reinforcing popular views of childhood. Todres, supra note 109. 
